Its Ok to Disagree With Joe Maddon
There has been a ton of chatter, rather stupid chatter, over the past couple of days which started because of former Chicago Cubs closer, Aroldis Chapman’s comments on his usage. While Chapman certainly comes off poorly, almost biting the hand that fed him (and certainly helped add a crooked number to his new contract) – he wasn’t wrong. He most certainly was overused. A guy that had 49 of the 50 fastest pitches in 2016 (and I’d imagine every year since he’s been a major leaguer) was topping out at 97 MPH in the ninth inning of game seven of the World Series.
When a guy lost more than 5 MPH on a fastball, they are tired, and in Chappy’s case, was overused. This should be undeniable, yet there are some that will deny it (I’d classify them in the same group as the ‘birthers’ I suppose). But the strange thing to come of this is the complete inability for people to have a discussion on the Cubs winning game seven in spite of Joe Maddon, and not because of him.
Yes Joe, the only reality that we live in is one in which the Chicago Cubs are 2016 World Series champions. But questioning you (er him…) doesn’t take any of that away, at all. By questioning Joe’s decisions (which 90% of you did while watching game seven) it doesn’t mean someone is being negative, just trying to find something to complain about, or discredit him or the Cubs accomplishments. All it is doing is highlighting some very poor decisions that were made, decisions which were the product over overthinking, and over-coaching the situations.
Take game six. The Cubs are up 7-2 in the seventh inning, and Joe turns to Chapman. Chapman, who had already thrown 82 pitches in the series which includes his longest outing of his career in game five, was asked to yet again come out and get more than three outs in a game. Mind you, Chapman has always disliked four plus out opportunities, and after his second multiple out save opportunity in August this was communicated to Joe.
“It’s not [my] favorite thing to do, but that’s [my] job,” Chapman said via Strop, who translated. “He’s the manager. The decision that [put me] out [there] in that situation, [I’m] just ready to do anything.”
Even though it isn’t his favorite, and he has been rather bad in those situations, give Chapman some credit for telling Joe that he was willing to be used in the manner that Joe used him in. This is where I get confused in the Chapman comments, why would you tell the manager that you can pitch that much then question your usage, but that’s not what this is about.
Chapman’s usage in games five and six, heavily weighed on his arm, and even if Chapman felt he could go out and pitch multiple innings, he just wasn’t strong enough to do it. It showed. Him being tired showed in game seven, and him not trusting his out pitch (a 100+ MPH fastball) because he couldn’t dial it up, is part of the reason Rajai Davis was able to connect for a three-run homer in the eighth inning.
But there were questionable decisions before Chapman. Kyle Hendricks was rolling, and Cleveland had proven they were completely unable to square him up. While the fifth inning of game seven was probably his last, with Jon Lester already warming up, Joe yanked him prematurely after Carlos Santana (who has struck out on the previous two pitches) earned a walk. Kyle just got two extremely quick outs, and should have been out of the inning, but instead Joe pulled him in favor of Jon Lester. Now Lester, who has come into game in relief before, had never done so in a “dirty inning” and was told before the game he would come in at the beginning of an inning. He consequently gave up a run on a couple of poor set of circumstances as well.
But that isn’t the thing. I am ok with bringing Jon in, if that is what was communicated, and if the situation called for it. Thing is, Joe went into that inning thinking if someone gets on, I am going to Jon. He didn’t take into account how someone got on, or the situation at all. It was a blatant case of predetermining what he was doing in advance. As a coach or manager, you think about things in advance, and try to put players in the best situation to succeed. Joe did not put Jon in a position to succeed in this case.
Then as Lester found his way, Joe happened again.
After Lester made quick work of Cleveland’s first two batters, Jose Ramirez hit a ball just out of the reach of Addison Russell’s outstretched glove. That was enough for Joe Maddon, a ball that could have been an infield out, results in being pulled, which again shows he had already determined that regardless of what happens, if a batter reaches Chappy was coming in. I’ve already talked about his results…
To add to the overthinking, Maddon asked Javier Baez (someone who had been possibly the most clutch Cub during the playoffs) to try and squeeze Jason Heyward in from third with two strikes. Baez missed that bunt and struck out. As Baez was walking back to the dugout he let out an incredible roar, showing his frustration. But Baez shouldn’t have been asked to bunt in the first place (one because it was dumb, and two because what should have happened would have changed the situation).
After David Ross earned a five-pitch walk, he was lifted for Chris Coghlan in an attempt to gain more speed. There were multiple options which would have been better than what actually did happen here. The Cubs could have had Heyward (who was now batting) bunt, putting Coghlan on second with one out. The Cubs could have had Coghlan straight steal second since the Indians catcher, Yan Gomes, had a bum shoulder and had a rough time throwing runners out since he came back from injury. Or, the Cubs could have called the hit and run with a struggling Heyward at the plate.
Joe called none of those, and Coghlan was forced out on a grounder off Jason’s bat. Now give Heyward some credit as he was hustling out of the box and beat the relay throw, which then he stole second and advanced to third on an errant throw by Gomes. But then of course we got the Baez strike out on the most awkward bunt attempt I’ve seen in some time.
Now, there are some that also criticize Joe for going to Carl Edwards Jr. in the 10th, after the Cubs had taken the lead, but I am ok with it. Edwards had shown an ability to pitch very well in the playoffs, and someone that has been tapped as a potential closer of the future he may have been the best bullet remaining. He did run into issues, which then Joe (rightfully so) went to Mike Montgomery to close things out, and the rest is history.
Look, the Cubs aren’t in the position they were in without Joe Maddon pulling the strings, but many of the positions they found themselves in during game seven were because of Joe pulling the wrong strings. This happens sometimes when you have a manager that does things half by the numbers and half by his feeling. There isn’t another manager in the game I’d rather have coaching the Cubs, while there are maybe two in baseball better than he is, I wouldn’t give him up for any of them. He is the perfect guy for this perfect storm here in Chicago, and the team doesn’t make the playoffs in 2015, and doesn’t break a 108 year drought without him at the helm.
But even with the gushing over Joe, there is certainly room to be critical of his decisions, and if I’ve learned anything from him these past two seasons, he will use this to be better next year.
